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Microfoundationalist Reconciliation: The
Fundamental Fantasy of Neoclassical
Economics—Some Reflections on Yahya
Madra’s Late Neoclassical Economics
Jason Glynos
Using neoclassical thought as his entry point, Yahya M. Madra offers a vital
prolegomenon to a recalibrated critical political economy. Madra’s reinterpretation of
the economic field pivots around what he calls the theoretical-humanist problematic,
suggesting that an ontologically inflected recharacterization of economic thought is
essential to any serious development of progressive alternatives to dominant
mainstream forms of political economy. After outlining the constituent elements of
theoretical humanism and some of Madra’s key conceptual moves, this essay explores
several analytical, normative, and ideological implications of such a redrawing of the
boundaries of economic thought. Madra’s intervention opens up at least three lines of
inquiry regarding the theoretical-humanist problematic: the relative amplitude of
tensions internal to different economic approaches in its orbit, including their
capacities to resist or escape its gravitational pull; how it circumscribes the scope of
concrete, normative visions; and how everyday practices and identifications reinforce
or depart from related ideological fantasies underpinning it.
Key Words: Antiessentialism, Ideological Critique, Late Neoclassical Economics,
Normative Critique, Theoretical Humanism
Contemporary mainstream economics is alive and healthy, exciting even,
overflowing as it is with new conceptual foci, objects of analysis, models,
and methodologies, which in turn provoke important debates and significant
refinements of approach. Unlike earlier iterations of mainstream (neoclassi-
cal) economics, a new set of concepts serve as the focus of theoretical and em-
pirical attention, such as market failure, institutions, transaction costs, and
information asymmetries, not to mention motivational diversity, cognitive
limits, strategy and social choice, and evolutionary stability. Accompanying
this new set of concepts are also new methodologies that scholars rely
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upon to conduct economic research, such as noncooperative game exercises,
economic experiments, and evolutionary modeling. How can this conceptual
and methodological novelty and heterogeneity not signal a clear break from
neoclassical economics?
In his Late Neoclassical Economics, Yahya Madra acknowledges the widely noted
variety of contemporary mainstream approaches to economics. However, in his
carefully crafted and sharply delivered text, he argues that this heterogeneity
and these novelty theses can be maintained only if one overlooks a crucial homo-
geneity that underlies the apparent heterogeneity, and also only if one overlooks
how the core that defines this spatial homogeneity—characterized in terms of the
“problematic of theoretical humanism”—stretches across time. The heterogeneity
and novelty theses sustained by the advocates of new mainstream economic ap-
proaches are thus counterposed to the “real” theses of homogeneity and continu-
ity. Insofar as the central tenets and performances of neoclassical economics
embody this core problematic, Madra argues that contemporary mainstream ap-
proaches to economics identified with the above preoccupations should not be un-
derstood to signal a decisive break from neoclassical economics. On the contrary,
they exhibit a deep continuity with it, so that the most one could say about con-
temporary mainstream economics is that it is a later iteration of neoclassical econom-
ics, summarized succinctly in the full title of Madra’s text: Late Neoclassical
Economics: The Restoration of Theoretical Humanism in Contemporary Economic
Theory.
It is very important to note how Madra’s intervention does not—to use Hei-
deggerian terms—amount to a mere exercise in ontic redescription. It rather
pitches itself as an ontological inquiry whose recharacterization implies a nontriv-
ial reinterpretation of the field of political economy as a whole, carrying with it
important political, normative, and ideological implications. Why point out the
severely circumscribed scope of the apparent novelty and heterogeneity? Why
foreground contemporary mainstream economics’ continuity with neoclassical
economics? Madra suggests that such an ontologically inflected recharacteriza-
tion is essential for anyone serious about developing genuinely alternative ap-
proaches to the political economy of our time, of course including progressive
alternatives, such as his favored (Amherst-school-inspired) antiessentialist-
Marxian surplus approach (Resnick and Wolff 1987, 2006; Gibson-Graham
1996, 2006).
In what follows I outline the key conceptual moves in Madra’s reinterpreta-
tion of the political-economic field. After describing the constituent elements of
theoretical humanism, I explore the normative, ideological, and political impli-
cations of such a redrawing of the boundaries of economic thought by identify-
ing several openings for further reflection and exploration enabled by Madra’s
intervention.
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The Theoretical-Humanist Problematic and Its Multifaceted
Architecture
Identified by Madra as a key post-Enlightenment notion, theoretical humanism
entails affirming all three of the following elements—two presuppositions and
one problematic—whether explicitly or not. Although these elements are not
always articulated in the exact same way across his text, which harbors the addi-
tional potential for productive ambiguities, I outline below what I take to be these
elements’ key features.
Presupposition One: Centered Subjectivity
This element entails positing the individual as a centered subject, even if only as an
ideal or theoretical construct. The subject is treated as autonomous (subjects should
make choices on the basis of their preference rankings, for which they assume re-
sponsibility), rational (preference rankings should be constructed in a consistent—
i.e., noncontradictory—manner that reflects subjects’ welfare or utility functions),
and self-transparent (subjects are or should be capable of becoming fully aware of
their preferences at themoment of choice and across time). This means that the the-
oretical ideal of a centered subjectivity is compatiblewith cases ofmotivational diver-
sity and alsowith institutional interferences and cognitive limitations that in practice
render concretely situated subjects unable to act on their choices, unable to rank
their preferences in a consistent manner, or even unaware of their own preferences.
Presupposition Two: Unique and Stable Equilibrium
This element entails the positing of a unique and stable equilibrium as an ideal at the
collective level, often articulated in terms of “perfect competition.” This can be un-
derstood as a collective-level rationality (e.g., a social or market rationality) that
entails consistency (noncontradiction) and that is cashed out as a function of ab-
solute cardinal utility in early neoclassical thought; or—in late neoclassical
thought—it can be understood in terms of a stable, relative ordinal utility,
whether (Pareto) efficient or not. Conceptualizations of equilibrium (or order) de-
veloped under different iterations of neoclassical thought include general equilib-
rium, partial equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, and evolutionary stability.
Problematic: Microfoundationalist Alignment
A unique, stable equilibrium at the collective level must be grounded in a centered
subjectivity at the individual level. This generates a question (or problematic)
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about how the two levels can be so “aligned” or “reconciled.” The answer to this
question usually comes in the form of the market mechanism, sometimes supple-
mented by other nonmarket devices.
Openings for Discussion
Insofar as one or more of the above elements is not affirmed, we could say that an
approach to political economy orbits outside the theoretical-humanist gravita-
tional field and thus also finds itself outside the neoclassical frame. Madra (2017,
5) offers the theoretical structuralism of the Arrow-Debreu (or A-D) model sort
and also Saffrian economics as examples of approaches that only affirm presup-
position two while the Austrian school is offered as an approach that only
affirms presupposition one. Conversely, there are some prima facie heterodox
schools of thought—analytical Marxism, for example—that do affirm all three el-
ements and thus do not escape the theoretical-humanist shadow. In this way
Madra seeks to redraw the boundaries of the neoclassical tradition and thus fore-
ground theoretical humanism as defining the “real” divide in economics (175). The
theoretical-humanist problematic, then, takes its bearing from the affirmation of all
three of the above elements, asking what mediating conditions will ensure that a
unique, stable equilibrium can emerge at the collective level, given the individual-
level assumption of a centered subjectivity. Such mediating conditions include, of
course, the market and various institutional market supplements, most of which
are produced and theorized dialectically in response to challenges internal to
mainstream neoclassical economics (corresponding to what Madra calls “structur-
alist moments” or moments of “structuralist drift,” embodied in Walrasian auc-
tioneers or Marshallian selection processes), but they are always framed by this
problematic. This intervention seeks to reframe our understanding not only of
neoclassical economic thought but also of economic thought more generally,
since this “real” divide cuts across the standard neoclassical/nonneoclassical
divide.
Although I am not a political economist or economic historian and am thus
unable to comment on the detail of the characterization exercise itself, I am
very interested in exploring the implications of Madra’s intervention from the
point of view of critical political theory, broadly conceived. I am especially inter-
ested in identifying the normative, ideological, and political implications of re-
drawing the boundaries of economic thought, not least because the “grip” of
theoretical humanism is so strong on “social theory and the discipline of econom-
ics in particular” (Madra 2017, 5). My aim is therefore to explore some of the pos-
sibilities opened up from a critical-political-theory perspective. And while
Madra’s text generates many rich lines of inquiry prompting further reflection
and research, here I will only focus on three such openings or “lines of flight.”
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Three Lines of Flight
As a first opening, one can ask how stable the characterization of neoclassical
thought remains when cast in terms of the theoretical-humanist problematic.
The constituent terms of the theoretical-humanist problematic (autonomy, ratio-
nality, equilibrium, efficiency, reconciliation, etc.) are, after all, explicitly under-
stood to be highly abstract terms, precisely in order to subsume the wide range
of their concrete instantiations across time in both the Walrasian and Marshallian
schools. This is of course partly a question about whether we think mainstream
economists, or even some prima facie heterodox economists, can or should be
able to recognize themselves as working within the orbit of this problematic. It
is also partly a question about whether it might be worth it—as part of a wider
critical-political-economy project—to identify particular strands of prima facie
(late) neoclassical approaches that introduce torsions that can be exegetically am-
plified to produce pathways that can exit the theoretical-humanist gravitational
field and that can thus be rearticulated within an alternative problematic and in
the service of a different vision. Take, for example, the work of behavioral econ-
omists (e.g., Frank 2011, 2016), who cash out motivational diversity with recourse to
a set of subindividual psychological mechanisms that appear to decenter the
subject (e.g., aversion to loss, adaptation, or the availability heuristic) and who
appeal to evolutionary and other tropes that might push in the direction of con-
flictual and/or nonequilibrium outcomes. In other words, a potential opening
might involve asking how tensions and ideas within particular strands of late neo-
classical thought, such as behaviorism, might be amplified in the service of an in-
ternal deconstructive critique and/or articulated to different projects, and in this
way might resist a straightforward subsumption under the theoretical-humanist
problematic.
A second, not unrelated, opening takes its bearing from what appears to be
really at stake in Madra’s recharacterization exercise. We can gain some insight
into the stakes of this exercise by asking ourselves what constitutes a “true” alter-
native to new mainstream economics. One way forward here might be to outline a
problematic distinct from the theoretical-humanist one, such as the one implied—
but not necessarily exhausted—by the antiessentialist-Marxian surplus approach.
Although this task is not done in the text itself—at least not in Madra’s systematic
way of elaborating the theoretical-humanist problematic—the possibility raises
an interesting question about how to conceptualize the relationship between
those economic approaches that orbit the theoretical-humanist problematic and
those that do not. Because such a relationship can be analyzed along at least
two axes: the axis of essentialism (having largely to do with ideology) and the
axis of principles and ideals of justice (having largely to do with normative
vision). Another line of flight might therefore involve exploring in more detail
how a problematic that is distinct from theoretical humanism may lead to distinc-
tively normative implications, not just ideological implications. Although it is true
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that late neoclassical thought is plural from the point of view of its new concepts
and methodologies, this pluralism is also one that orbits tightly around theoretical
humanism and its problematic. So even though the pluralism internal to neoclas-
sical thought does generate a pluralism at the level of “inferences and policy con-
clusions” (Madra 2017, 9), the thrust of Madra’s argument appears to suggest that
this policy pluralism is also circumscribed by the theoretical-humanist problem-
atic, which points to this second opening. This is because there is still quite a bit of
room left for this policy-cum-normative delimitation to be spelled out more
clearly and expansively, especially in relation to “true” alternatives to theoreti-
cal-humanist approaches. (This is not to say, of course, that some overlap in the
formulation of the implications of competing problematics is not permissible
but only that, in identifying what is really at stake, it would be important to
have a clearer sense of the region of nonoverlap, if any.)
In this respect, one of the most intriguing parts of Madra’s (2017, 179–80) text is
also one of the shortest. These passages in the book’s conclusion make clear that
the critical vantage point furnished by the antiessentialist-Marxian surplus ap-
proach stretches well beyond ideological (essentialist) worries to address more
concrete theoretical-analytical and normative concerns. From this perspective,
neoclassical economists focus their theoretical and analytical gaze upon
moments of consumption and, when they do shift their attention to the
moment of production, this is problematized from an exchange perspective,
leaving out of view the multiple and overdetermined conditions, forms, and tra-
jectories of surplus-labor production, appropriation, and distribution. Although
the essentialism implied in the idea of a harmonious reconciliation is abandoned
in the Marxian surplus approach, it is also clear that particular normative visions
and policy prescriptions associated with the Marxian surplus approach are not
abandoned. This, it seems to me, opens the door to a potentially fruitful exercise
of demanding much-increased critical and concrete comparative engagement
between particular approaches operating within the (prima facie) theoretical-hu-
manist orbit (e.g., with certain strands of behaviorism) and those outside that orbit
—particularly the antiessentialist-Marxian surplus approach—in order to cash
out more forcefully the promise of the latter. The implications for how we
might think key concepts of political economy through this comparative exercise
are especially interesting. For example, how might the concept of competition
receive different accents and inflections from the perspective of (essentialist) the-
oretical-humanist economic approaches vis-à-vis alternative (nonessentialist) ap-
proaches, including especially the Marxian surplus approach?
A final opening concerns the sort of critical empirical research that Madra’s
intervention suggests we need to promote. As Madra points out, Colander et al.
(2004, 492) note in a revealing passage how “modern mainstream economics is
open to new approaches, as long as they are done with a careful understanding
of the strengths of the recent orthodox approach and with a modeling method-
ology acceptable to the mainstream.” Buying into the “neoclassical break”
578 Glynos
thesis mentioned in the opening paragraph of this essay is thus problematic
not only because scholars are in practice taken seriously only when they can
demonstrate that they are familiar with the latest mathematical modeling
methodologies but also because the “new mainstream” can and does marginal-
ize or dismiss heterodox critiques of neoclassical thought as out of date and out
of touch (Madra 2017, 12). The “break” thesis—insofar as it is mobilized and
perpetuated by neoclassical scholars, policy makers, as well as actors
engaged in and benefiting from organizational practices governed by neoclassi-
cal presuppositions—thus instantiates a “political logic” that preempts the con-
testation of its theoretical-humanist core. One can hypothesize that this
political logic owes its strength and potency to the shared underlying funda-
mental fantasy of the “microfoundationalist reconciliation” underpinning the
apparent pluralism of the neoclassical tradition. As Madra points out, the em-
bracing of theoretical humanism “has become much more than a mere intellec-
tual tradition or theoretical orientation. It has become a design for living, a
new mode of life, a new governmental rationality, a new model of subjectivity”
(178). This accounts not only for the resilience of the tradition in the face of
various economic crises—the 2008 crisis being the latest one (we still await
the long-term effects of the COVID-19 “event” to make themselves fully felt
at the level of political-economic thinking)—but it also points to the challenge
facing heterodox economists who seek to bring something fresh to the table.
This is a nontrivial challenge because—to put it in Gramscian terms—such
genuine alternatives cannot become realistically hegemonic options unless
and until a new common sense has been woven into the fabric of social life
(178). It suggests that we should expect to find the fundamental fantasy of
microfoundationalist reconciliation not only in scholarly tracts and policy
debates but also in numerous secondary expressions of everyday life, many ar-
ticulated in terms of personal and individual responsibility, competition, and
the survival of the fittest, inviting researchers to engage in something akin to
critical fantasy studies. More broadly, it suggests that critical engagement
with neoclassical thought, as well as critical political-economic research more
generally, needs to take place across a wide range of sites, ranging from aca-
demic discourse to everyday practice.
Conclusion
Using neoclassical thought as his entry point, Madra’s exegetical tour de force
offers a generous and deeply reflexive critical prolegomenon to a recalibrated crit-
ical political economy. It is clear from his text that the problematic concerning
theoretical humanism is twofold, since we can locate the problem both in its par-
ticular normative content and also in the ideological status attributed to that content.
The problem of normativity has to do with the concrete contents that are
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attributed to key concepts embodying theoretical humanism’s presuppositions,
such as autonomy, rationality, self-transparency (at the level of the individual),
and equilibrium (at the collective level), as well as key relationships (e.g., that
the collective and individual levels should align in such a way that the collective
accommodates the individual). The problem with these particular contents is that
they tend to both reflect and normatively reinforce the status quo, conceived as an
exploitative liberal-democratic capitalism, an evaluation made possible from the
standpoint of Madra’s (2017, 36) Marxian surplus-value approach.
But the problem with theoretical humanism is not restricted to its normative
contents. It also extends to the status attributed to these contents. Here, the
problem is not the fact that humans have come to occupy the space of the
logos, the locus of the divine being. The problem with theoretical humanism is
rather the ideological status attributed to the human as a centered subject and
also as a guarantor of a collective sense and end. From Madra’s point of view,
neither is the subject centered nor is the collective consistent. In investing theo-
retical humanism with ideological import in this way, neoclassical thought thus
“provides the theoretical foundations of a normative justification of exploitation,
[and] functions as an ideological state apparatus that contributes to the reproduc-
tion of the liberal democratic capitalism” (Madra 2017, 36). This is why Madra’s
antiessentialist intervention should be understood as a form of ideological cri-
tique—not just as a form of normative critique—that seeks to substitute mechan-
ical causality with overdetermination, consistency with contradiction, necessity
with contingency, categories with processes, being with becoming. Although the
Marxian surplus approach features briefly in the text, and the Lacanian psycho-
analytic approach even less so, these appear to be pivotal in making these anties-
sentialist moves.
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